

# **FIELD EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION OF FORMER REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA**

## *FIELD VISIT REPORT*

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**Evaluating the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Engagement and Programming in Promoting  
Local Integration of Refugees in Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon**

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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Engagement and  
Programming in Promoting Local Integration of Refugees in  
Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon

**Submitted to:**

Office of Policy and Resource Planning, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration  
(PRM), U.S. Department of State

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## ACRONYM LIST

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DLI	Development through Local Integration
dTS	Development and Training Services, Inc.
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GRA	Government of the Republic of Angola
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	National Registration Card
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Funds
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmers Union

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## I. INTRODUCTION

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A two-person team funded by PRM traveled to Zambia from February 1-24, 2014 to conduct a field evaluation of local integration of former Angolan refugees. The team interviewed over 200 former Angolan refugees, including a mix of men and women, all age groups, those who live in the government settlements and those who have self-settled, as well as those from the first wave of refugees (starting in 1966) and the second wave (starting in the late 1990s and those that arrived from 2000 to 2002). The team also interviewed Zambians in the host communities, traditional leaders, and officials from the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), the Government of the Republic of Angolan (GRA), partner governments, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, and the World Bank.

## II. FINDINGS

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The team found that the Angolans have been integrated economically and socially and that a plan is in motion for their legal integration. Although their status as refugees ended on June 30, 2012, they are still considered persons of concern for the GRZ and UNHCR and will be beneficiaries of the Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia. In many ways the Angolans have become integrated economically and are self-reliant. Like many Zambians, they still struggle to feed their families and pay school fees for their children, but they no longer rely on UNHCR assistance. Their economic integration will be complete once they are legally integrated, gaining ownership of land, enjoying freedom of movement, and having all the rights of Zambians in terms of working in the formal economy. Socially, the Angolans are fully integrated with Zambians as they attend school and church with each other, they play sports and celebrate holidays together, and they intermarry. In both of the two current settlements – Mayukwayukwa and Meheba – the Angolans and Zambians who live side-by-side share cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties. The Angolans feel safe and protected in Zambia and consider it home.

The next major opportunity for Angolans is to become legally integrated. This process has begun with the GRZ offering permanent residency to 10,000 Angolans who will then be eligible for citizenship in ten years. This generous offer also includes discounts for the residency permits from the GRZ and UNHCR covering the remaining costs. The GRA is facilitating this process by providing, at no cost to the former Angolan refugees, National Registration Cards (NRCs) and Angolan passports, which are required as part of the documentation process. As of February 2014, around 6,000 Angolans have applied for the local integration program and there is full confidence in both the GRZ and the GRA that this process will continue to move forward. Among the hundreds of people interviewed by the evaluation team, no doubt was expressed in either governments' commitment, only concerns that the process is moving slowly and that full and accurate information has not yet been made available to the Angolans about the documentation process or the other aspects of the local integration program. Additionally, for many Angolans, the only form of identification they currently have is their UNHCR refugee cards, which are now expired, so they are feeling vulnerable without proper identification.

An unintended positive consequence of the documentation process is that the GRA's outreach to Angolans in Zambia has increased the former refugees' confidence in the GRA and increased their desire to return to Angola. Unfortunately, it has also had an unintended negative consequence. The GRZ's offer for permanent residency is currently only open to Angolans who arrived in Zambia between 1966 and 1986, leaving those who arrived after 1986 and who do not wish to return to Angola, feeling discriminated against and anxious about their future. Many believe that they will be forced to return to Angola.

The next stage in the local integration program will be to provide additional land for the Angolans to cultivate alongside an equal number of Zambians. This land will come with a subsidized agricultural package consisting of seed and fertilizer, and the opportunity to acquire a title deed after successfully farming the land for two years. While the offer of additional land is generous and welcome, it does require that a majority Angolans who qualify for the local integration program to move to an area designated for the local integration program. This is being met by resistance of some who have established homes, farms, and businesses after living in the settlements for many decades. In addition to concerns over what they will be leaving, they also have concerns about what the resettlement area, i.e., plot size, quality of soil and the amount of work required to prepare for cultivation, water, housing, schools, clinics, roads, bridges, markets, etc. Similarly, those who do not qualify for local integration may be required to move out of the area designated for local integration and are uncertain about where they will go and how they will be treated since they have no status and no formal identification papers.

### **III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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Overall, the efforts of GRZ and UNHCR that have been made in Zambia since the arrival of the first wave of Angolan refugees in 1966 have resulted in a population of Angolans who have integrated well into their host communities in Zambia, both socially and economically. The success in the social integration can be attributed, in part, to the shared cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties, but also to the welcoming attitudes of the Zambians toward the Angolans, the respect that the Angolans show for the culture and the traditional leadership of the Zambians, and the ease with which Angolans and Zambians mix socially. The evaluation team did not interview Zambians outside the host communities, so the team only has a limited amount of information to report on how self-settled Angolans have integrated and cannot predict how well the government-settled Angolans will integrate once they are granted full freedom of movement under the local integration program. The economic integration has been facilitated by the GRZ's wisdom and generosity in providing access to land for the Angolans upon arrival in Zambia, as well as full access to schools and health clinics, and relative ease leaving the settlement for casual labor opportunities. Certainly the key factors have been in place for social and economic integration.

Among donor governments and government-settled refugees interviewed there is confidence in the GRZ's commitment to provide a pathway to citizenship and therefore complete integration of the former Angolan refugees in Zambia over the next few years. Similarly, the Angolan government is cooperating fully and is keeping their commitment to provide the required documentation free of charge to the former refugees. Additionally, the GRZ's offer and process for larger plots of land, along with agricultural inputs, will help strengthen self-reliance of the

Angolans. The refugees that qualify for the local integration are cautiously optimistic, but the refugees who do not qualify are concerned. As a whole, many enabling factors are being put into place for the local integration program to succeed, paving the way for Zambia to serve as a model for local integration of refugees.

While many enabling factors are in place, there are also potential barriers to successful implementation of the local integration program. One of the major concerns is whether sufficient resources will be secured to fund the three-year local integration program and whether there will be the same level of commitment to fund the Zambia-Angola resettlement as there has been to fund the GRZ's existing resettlement schemes. There is also the potential for resistance from the former Angolan refugees who are eligible for local integration when they will be required to move out of the refugee area. The potential for resistance is even greater among the Angolans who do not wish to repatriate and are not eligible to live in the resettlement area and no longer qualified to live in the refugee settlement.

To address these issues, and others raised in the findings, the evaluation team offers the following recommendations to increase the likelihood of success of Zambia's program to locally integrate the former Angolan refugees. In terms of timing, the recommendations regarding documentation should be implemented immediately, as this component is now in progress, and the recommendations about information campaigns should also be given top priority; the other recommendations should be implemented in the next three to six months, assuming the local integration program stays on schedule. In terms of resources to implement the recommendations, for any actions directed toward the GRZ and GRA, it is recommended that these actions be funded by the respective governments. Additionally, it is recommended that Donor Governments and UNHCR participate in funding the three-year local integration program, with a special focus on the basic infrastructure required.

#### **Documentation/Alternative Legal Status**

1. GRZ should expand the *criteria for local integration* to include all Angolans, not just those who arrived between 1966 and 1986. This will help reach the target of 10,000 and address the issues among those who do not currently qualify for local integration. This may also result in the unintended positive consequence of more Angolans choosing to return as they gain confidence in the GRA.
2. GRA should increase the *size of the teams* processing documentation to expedite the provision of National Registration Cards and passports so that the next steps in the local integration program can move forward. Expediting the documentation process will also increase the confidence of the former Angolan refugees and partner governments that are potential donors to the local integration program.
3. GRZ should expedite the process of offering *Alien cards* to all former Angolan refugees, and possibly reduce the cost, so that they have a valid form of identification while waiting to complete the process for local integration or returning to Angola.
4. GRZ, working with UNHCR, should expedite their plans for an *information campaign* to provide full and accurate information about the documentation process, both verbally and in writing, so that the former refugees can make informed decisions about the opportunity for local integration or repatriation and to ease their anxiety levels. The verbal and written communications should be in the major languages and outline all the currently known

information, step-by-step and include frequently asked questions. Additional information can be presented in subsequent communications.

### **Relocating/Integrated Resettlement Program**

5. GRZ, in collaboration with UNHCR, should expand the *information campaign* to provide details about the plan for the “resettlement” area, plot sizes, agricultural packages, and the social services. The campaign should include community meetings where the former refugees are given the opportunity to provide input and feedback, especially about the layout of the resettlement area and the timing for moving to the area. Traditional leaders in the area should be given routine updates and opportunities for providing input and should be considered as participants to this process. The GRZ should take the lead in the information campaign to emphasize that it is a GRZ program and that UNHCR’s role with the former Angolan refugees is phasing out.
6. GRZ and UNHCR should ensure that all *basic infrastructure* is in place before any of the former refugees are required to move to the resettlement area. Donor Governments need to come forward with funding immediately to address the basic infrastructure needs, as Canada has. This will ease the anxiety of those who are concerned about moving into the bush, as they assume it is, and minimize the disruptions in school and health care, among other things.
7. GRZ should rethink the current plans for *housing* in the resettlement area, which includes providing cement, doors, and window (but no roof) and requires a 25 percent co-share with the former Angolan refugees, as well as the Zambians who will live in the resettlement area. In rethinking the plans, they should consult with Habitat for Humanity or other organizations that have successfully used approaches for community participation in designing and building houses in a rural setting.
8. GRZ should network and coordinate with national and international NGOs that are currently implementing *credit schemes* in the provinces where the settlements are located.
9. GRZ, through the Ministry of Agriculture, should provide expanded *extension services* in the first few years of the local integration program. This will help both the Angolans and Zambians maximize the productivity of the land that they will be cultivating.
10. GRZ should start considering how they will approach the unique challenges of *governance* in the resettlement area. Careful consideration should be given to the role of traditional leaders. In addition, the role of UNHCR must come to an end and the population must not look to UNHCR for protection or services but rather to the GRZ to fulfill this and/or civil society organizations and/or the traditional leadership mechanisms. It is also worth considering the community-driven development approach that was pioneered by the World Bank, USAID, and others, and subsequently adapted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for post conflict situations. See Attachment C for IRC’s manual on Community Driven Reconstruction that can easily be applied to this resettlement scheme.

### **Advocacy for Refugee Affected Areas**

11. UNCHR should work with host communities to establish a system for monitoring the reproduction of fish, chickens, and bees that are part of the Quick Impact Projects. The benefiting community should provide the resources for the monitoring system to ensure that there is a continuous source of new fish, chickens and/or bees as current populations are either harvested or naturally die out.



### **Recommended Practices from Zambia for other Countries considering Local Integration**

Local integration successes and practices are largely dependent on the political, social, and economic environment of the host country and the country of origin of protracted refugee situations. The national laws, cultural differences, the historical events, and the reason for the original conflict that caused the refugee situation are so varied from one region to another. These variations have an effect on how local integration can or cannot be implemented. Therefore, recommended practices for local integration from one protracted refugee situation to another is limited. Nevertheless, the evaluation team highlights the following practices from GRZ and GRA that can apply to current or future local integration programs.

12. Provide a national identification card and passport from the refugees' country of origin. Providing this necessary identification guarantees full protection and no risk of statelessness or temporary "in limbo" status for the refugees.
13. Provide designated areas of land and allocate land for both the refugees and host country citizens to settle and form a new community or expand an existing community. This is especially relevant when the refugees predominantly rely on agricultural livelihoods. It is preferable that this land be near the area where refugees originally settled, which will allow for greater integration, as the refugees will already be known by these communities.

# CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

## A. SCOPE OF WORK

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The purpose of the field-based evaluation in Zambia was to assist in determining the success of PRM and UNHCR's programming and engagement and to recommend what PRM should be doing to support local integration. The findings from this field visit supplement the findings from an earlier desk review and will be complemented by subsequent field visits to Cameroon and Tanzania.

The full study, consisting of the desk study and three field visits, focuses on three key questions:

1. To what extent has the programming and engagement of PRM and UNHCR promoted local integration?
2. What programmatic and diplomatic interventions, as identified by PRM and UNHCR, were most and least successful?
3. What should PRM and its partners be doing to support the self-reliance of refugee populations for whom voluntary return and resettlement are not feasible.

A number of other questions are included in the contract's Statement of Work, including these specific questions about Zambia:

1. What have been the barriers to making progress?
2. What more should be done programmatically and diplomatically to address these barriers?
3. How best can PRM and UNHCR encourage the Government of Angola to work with Zambian counterparts in facilitating local integration?
4. Are there any lessons learned from the 2000-2002 UNHCR-Government of Zambia Initiative (for local integration of Angolan refugees) that can be applied to other local integration efforts?

This report first reviews the successes and challenges to date and then presents the opportunities and challenges in the future with the local integration program. All the findings are presented first and the report ends with the team's conclusions and recommendations.

## B. METHODOLOGY

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Over the three-week period in Zambia, the evaluation team conducted a series of interviews, made observations and reviewed documentation. The evaluation included interviews of key informants in Lusaka, Kaoma, Mongu, and Solwezi; focus group and individual interviews with former Angolan refugees in and around the settlements of Mayukwayukwa and Meheba; and traditional leaders and community members in the areas hosting the Angolans. Short visits were also made to five of UNHCR's Quick Impact Projects, including two fish farms, two poultry farms, and a basic school.

The interviews consisted of semi-structured focus groups and structured, in-depth individual interviews as follows:

<b>Interview Type</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Eligibility for Local Integration</b>	<b>Government Settlement vs Self-Settled</b>
Focus Group – Angolans	129 Males 78 Females	<18 20% 18-29 10% 30-50 40% >50 30%	48%	GS 65% SS 35%
In-depth One-on-One – Angolans	10 Males 11 Females	<18 5% 18-29 24% 30-50 38% >50 33%	57%	GS 100%
Focus Groups – Zambian Host Community	26 Males 23 Females	<18 0% 18-29 12% 30-50 45% >50 43%	n/a	n/a
<b>TOTAL</b>	165 Males 112 Females  <b>277 TOTAL</b>	<18 15.5% 18-29 11% 30-50 40% >50 33%	49%	GS 68% SS 32%

The evaluation team aimed to have a balance of males and females and equal representation from all age groups, those who are qualified for local integration and those who are not, and those who live in the government settlement schemes and those who self-settled. Unfortunately, the balance was not always achieved. In terms of the male/female balance, both were invited to participate in the focus groups, but a disproportionate number of men showed up. Similarly, a small number of individuals under the age of 30 showed up for the focus group, possibly because they were working during the time of the focus groups. When seeking people for one-on-one interviews, the team was able to achieve a better balance between males and females and for those 18 years and older.

Self-settled refugees were particularly challenging to interview. In the area around Mayukwayukwa, UNHCR was able to gather several groups of men and several groups of women. However, no self-settled refugees were contacted in the area around Meheba. It is challenging to mobilize the self-settled refugees because UNHCR and the GRZ do not have formal contact with the self-settled refugees or communication networks among them. The refugees themselves make it difficult to find them because they are undocumented and therefore avoid government officials who they fear will deport them.

In addition, the team interviewed more than 50 officials from the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) at the national, provincial, and district levels, the Government of the Republic of Angolan (GRA), traditional leaders, and officials from UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, the World Bank, and partner governments, including the United States.

# CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

## A. LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION

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Naturalization of a refugee to the country of refuge is a key principle in the refugee convention, as stated in Article 34, “The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings” (UN Refugee Convention, Article 34 p. 30). This fundamental principle is again mandated in the instructions, the Statue, which governs the office of UNHCR where UNHCR is required not only to protect refugees, but also must seek “durable solutions” for refugees. The three durable solutions for refugees are: (1) repatriation, where a refugee returns to their country of origin, (2) resettlement, where a third country (not the country of refuge) offers to settle and provide the necessary steps to full citizenship to the refugee, and (3) naturalization or local integration, the more common term used, is where the country of refuge allows refugees to permanently settle in the country and is expected to offer necessary steps to citizenship and/or permanent residency status as a durable solution (UNHCR Website: Resettlement).

The majority of refugees, no matter how long or short their length of refugee status, voluntarily repatriate. Repatriation is the most desired durable solution by most refugees; the psychology and practical matters of “there is no place like home” is very powerful. For resettlement, approximately only one percent of refugees around the world succeed in being offered a resettlement package to a third country, where that third country, provides integration and eventual citizenship programs. In the case of Zambia, it was challenging to find any data on resettlement for Angolans, and therefore assumed that there was very little resettlement to a third country. (It is important to note that in the remainder of this report when the term “resettlement” is used, it is part of Zambia’s local integration program that includes relocating, or resettling, the former Angolan refugees in a place where they can settle permanently.)

Given that not all refugees can or will go home and few resettle to a third country, knowing how to effectively promote and implement local integration is an important solution for refugees. Discovering and applying best practices to promote local integration through humanitarian diplomacy and programming is of critical value and is the priority of this evaluation.

## B. DEFINING AND MEASURING LOCAL INTEGRATION

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In order to explore the practices of local integration, it must first be defined. There is a plethora of definitions for local integration yet no universal definition. Nor does the UN Refugee convention provide a legal definition of local integration except it does clearly state that it should include naturalization (Article 34), thus steps to full citizenship. Based upon the literature, local integration is most commonly defined as a process involving three broad categories: economic, social, and legal integration where a refugee achieves certain minimum standards within the host country’s social, economic, and legal frameworks (1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees).

Economic integration is the process where a refugee is able to participate in the job or self-employment market, including farming, that is commensurate with their skills and/or they obtain a standard of self-sufficiency or a standard of living that is similar to the host country population. Examples of key economic factors that lead to self-sufficiency are access to land for at least subsistence farming and/or cash crops, access to local markets to sell goods, access to daily worker or casual labor markets, access to credit, livelihood training, and access to professional licenses and/or work permits (Kulhman, Aug 1990:3).

Social integration is a reciprocal process where the host community and state accepts the refugee into their community without fear of discrimination, intimidation or repression and the refugee is able to create and maintain social bonds and links within the host community (Crisp 2004:1-2). Given this definition, key social indicators are: participation of the refugee in shared ethnic and/or religious traditions with the host community, inter-marriages, participation in national celebrations, creating relationships with members of other communities, shared linguistic skills, and civil society participation in local and central government and non-government services (Agar & Strang, 2004:3-4).

Legal integration is best defined as a process “...whereby refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state...The process whereby refugees gain and accumulate rights may lead to the acquisition of permanent residence rights and ultimately to the acquisition of citizenship in the country of asylum” (Crisp: Apr 2004:1). Indicators of legal integration are freedom of movement, travel documents (such as a passport), residential permits, work permits, and the ultimate final step of official citizenship or permanent residency.

The processes of economic, social, and legal integration are interdependent. The three processes can also be catalyst for further integration. For example, a refugee who is employed within the host community will by default increase the social links and knowledge of the community. If a refugee has access to health and education services, this also serves as a greater social and cultural catalyst through the exposure and contact the refugee will have within a host community. Certain elements of legal integration, such as freedom of movement, increases the ability of a refugee to have access to markets thus increases the chances of economic integration and self-sufficiency. Additionally, one of the most important indicators of local integration that encompasses all integration processes is safety and security. A refugee must feel safe and secure in order to even begin to locally integrate. If harassment, discrimination, violent and/or criminal acts are a constant threat to a refugee this will severely constrain the ability of a refugee to integrate economically, socially, and/or legally (Kulhman, Aug 1990:3-5).

## **C. OVERVIEW OF ZAMBIA SETTLEMENTS**

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There are currently two settlements in Zambia: Mayukwayukwa in the Western Province and Meheba in the Northwestern Province. Mayukwayukwa was established in 1966 as the first settlement in Africa for Angolans and Meheba was established in 1971 and is now the largest settlement in Zambia. Over the years Zambia has hosted refugees from Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and the use of settlements is the government’s primary tool for housing and taking care of refugees. Refugees from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe also have been hosted by Zambia, but significant numbers of these

populations were not registered with UNHCR, and these specific refugee populations were not the focus of this evaluation.

Both settlements are a significant distance from urban areas and cover a vast area. Meheba, for example, covers 720 square kilometers, which is roughly the size of Singapore. Because of its size and poor road conditions, it can take several hours to travel from one end of the settlement to the opposite end.

Both settlements are composed of people from a variety of countries, but Angolans are the largest group in both settlements. At the peak in 2002, there were estimated to be 188,000 Angolan refugees in Zambia. The chart below shows the numbers of refugees at each settlement as of December 2013, according to UNHCR's website.

	<b>Total Population</b>	<b>Angolan Population</b>
Mayukwayukwa	11,366	8,039 (71%)
Meheba	17,806	6,952 (39%)
Self-Settled estimate (urban and rural)	23,847	8,253 (35%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>53,019</b>	<b>23,244 (44%)</b>

The Angolan population in the settlements and self-settled are from the first wave of refugees (starting in 1966) and the second wave (starting in the mid-1990s and a large influx from 2000 - 2002), thus many of the Angolans have lived in Zambia for nearly 50 years, many of whom were born in Zambia and have never been to Angola. Despite this, all of the Angolans interviewed continue to speak their native languages, as well as other languages spoken in the settlements.

Both settlements have benefited from UNHCR and NGO programs over the years. These programs have included food assistance, education assistance, credit schemes, livelihood training, agricultural inputs, such as seed as fertilizer, and health clinics. Most programs have phased out of Mayukwayukwa, while Meheba still has programs through the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (food security, income-generating activities) the Ministry of Community Development and Mother and Child Health (child protection, prevention of gender-based violence, women's affairs, community services).

On June 30, 2012 the Cessation Clause was invoked and the Angolans lost their refugee status. They continue to be "persons of concern" to UNHCR and the GRZ and most of those who originally established themselves in the government settlement schemes still live within the boundaries of the scheme. While few now receive food assistance or other services from UNHCR, most still consider themselves as refugees and benefit from the infrastructure and services available in the settlements. Those who spontaneously settled never benefited from UNHCR assistance and continue to live outside the boundaries of the settlements, both in urban and rural areas in Zambia.

The settlements are governed by an international agreement between the GRZ and UNHCR and sub-agreements with implementing partners and GRZ line ministries. Refugee officers manage the settlements with support from line ministries of the GRZ, UNHCR staff, and refugee leadership.

The majority of the funding for both settlements comes directly from UNHCR or through the Office of the Commissioner of Refugees whose funding also predominantly comes from UNHCR. The refugee leadership consists of a chairperson, vice chairperson, and secretary. In the case of Mayukwayukwa, the settlement is further organized by sectors, with refugees serving as sector leaders and in Meheba the settlement is organized by blocks, with refugees serving as block leaders. All refugee leadership positions are secured through routine elections. Both settlements also have neighborhood watch committees who help maintain security, with support of police. Freedom of movement is somewhat restricted, with the refugee officer responsible for issuing gate passes for refugees and former refugees to leave the settlement. Refugees report that it is easy to get a gate pass that allows them to go anywhere in Zambia for a specified period of time. However, those living far from the refugee office find it burdensome to walk the distance to get the pass and therefore often bypass this requirement.

# CHAPTER III: EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION IN ZAMBIA

## A. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES TO DATE

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The team found that the Angolans are *de facto* integrated after nearly 50 years in Zambia. Furthermore, a plan is in motion for legal integration of many of the Angolans whose status as refugees ended on June 30, 2012 when the Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention was invoked.

The various enablers of economic, social, and legal integration are explored below based on findings from interviews of over 200 Angolans in Zambia, as well as members of the host communities, traditional leaders, and officials of the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) and the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA), and other key informants.

### Self-Reliance

The Angolans in Zambia have become integrated economically and have become more self-reliant over time. Those who have been in the government settlements initially relied on UNHCR assistance for food, shelter, and social services and were given land by the GRZ. However, at this point, only the disadvantaged continue to receive food assistance and the rest of the former Angolans refugees have been providing for themselves for many years. While the majority does not rely on external assistance, their self-reliance is based primarily on subsistence farming and most live a hand-to-mouth existence and have not been able to gain economically beyond a poor rural farming economic lifestyle. For those Angolans who spontaneously settled, they never benefited from assistance from UNHCR. Thus, these self-settled refugees have been providing for themselves through the generosity of the host country communities sharing land and accepting them into their community. Their agricultural work and casual labor efforts have been their primary source of survival which is similar activities to those who are in settlements.

The most important factors in the achievement of self-reliance of Angolans in Zambia have been access to land and access to casual labor, both of which helped the Angolans provide for their families and eliminated their dependence on external assistance. While access to credit, training, and formal employment could also have contributed, these have not been factors in Zambia. If the Angolans had more access credit, training, and formal employment, they would have been in a better position to produce cash crops, access markets, and obtain jobs with wages comparable to their Zambian counterparts that would have allowed them to move beyond their current level of poverty.

Despite their lack of reliance on external assistance, the Angolans in Zambia still struggle economically. Their economic situation parallels their impoverished Zambian counterparts in the same area: they are generally subsistence farmers, some produce cash crops, and they often do not have enough food to feed their families or cash to pay school or clinic fees. They differ from



Zambians in that they do not have full freedom of movement and cannot legally work in the formal job sector. To an extent, they have compensated for these limitations by obtaining gate passes (with relative ease) to take advantage of opportunities for casual labor, thus obtaining cash to buy food and pay for school and clinic fees. Unfortunately, not all Angolans have been able to access casual labor and some of those who provide casual labor are often paid in crops rather than cash, paid lower than a fair wage, or not paid at all. When this is the case, they are still unable to pay for school and clinic fees.

**Access to Land.** The GRZ had the wisdom and was generous enough to provide land for the Angolans upon their arrival in the settlements in Zambia, which is a major factor in the Angolans' success in becoming self-reliant. While the documentation states that each household was given 2.5 hectares, many Angolans could not verify how much land they have and it appears that many have less than 2.5 hectares, although some have more. Those who have more than 2.5 hectares either inherited it from their parents or assumed control over land that left by those who repatriated. The government-settled Angolans who participated in the evaluation indicated that they do not pay rent for using the land and they do not have any official documentation confirming that it is their land.

While the land that the Angolans were given has been key in helping them become self-reliant, in most cases they have only enough to be subsistence farmers, often not producing enough to feed their families throughout the year, let alone to grow cash crops or to move beyond their poor rural existence. However, some are able to grow enough to sell to the Food Reserve Agency, local markets, or neighbors. All the Angolans interviewed must also rely on casual labor, or other sources of income, to supplement what they can grow.

For those Angolans in the settlements – Mayukwayukwa and Meheba – land is often available around their home for farming and small animals, such as chickens and goats. Many also have larger plots away from their homes that they farm. Maize is the largest crop in both settlements, but Angolans also cultivate cassava, groundnuts, sorghum, soybeans, and sweet potatoes. Initially, UNHCR helped them with seeds and farm tools, such as the commonly used hand-hoe and seeds, but they no longer provide assistance. However, they would very much appreciate assistance with fertilizer, as the land they have been cultivating for decades is not as fertile as it once was. Furthermore, their plots are not large enough for proper crop rotation and they have not taken advantage of and/or have not been provided the knowledge of other farming methods for maximizing productivity.

Those who self-settled either pay rent (in cash or in-kind) to farm other's land or are paid in cash or crops to help farm other's land. This has made it especially challenging to provide for their families. In addition, there are increasing tensions between the Angolans and Zambians in the host communities because previous arrangements are being reconsidered as Zambian children inherit the land that their parents once rented to the Angolans. Similarly, as rural village populations grow, the tensions increase on how best to distribute the land to the growing Zambian population in the area and thus there is pressure to reassign the land to a Zambian family.

**Access to Credit.** Access to credit has the potential of strengthening self-reliance by moving individuals out of subsistence farming to producing cash crops, or by providing them the means to

start businesses, or by obtaining education or training. Unfortunately, very few of the Angolans interviewed reported having borrowed money as refugees. In Mayukwayukwa there are no current credit schemes available to the Angolans and the credit programs in Meheba are not well known. Some individuals in Meheba report borrowing money from neighbors or from a Women's Club.

When asked why more do not seek credit, the Angolans reported that they do not know how to access it and the ones they know about are too small to make much difference, the interest rates are too high, they believe credit is only needed if one wants to start a business, or they know they would not have the resources to pay back a loan.

**Access to Employment and Other Forms of Livelihoods.** Like credit, jobs in the formal sector would also enhance the Angolans' self-reliance. However, full-time, permanent work for cash wages is extremely uncommon among the Angolans in Zambia. While a few of the Angolans interviewed have had formal jobs in the past, the majority currently rely on casual labor, or "piece work" as they refer to it, to supplement the crops and cash they get from farming. These casual labor opportunities are usually in the form of farm work, weeding, digging, chopping trees, or light construction.

The livelihoods of the Angolans, like all the current and former refugees in Zambia, are limited because of the lack freedom of employment. Furthermore, they cannot secure formal jobs without a work permit and work permits are not available to them. This severely restricts a significant form of livelihood and prevents non-farmers from making good use of the skills they brought with them from Angola. For example, the evaluation team interviewed a nurse in the Mayukwayukwa settlement who was formally trained and certified in Angola, but his skills were never used in Zambia nor most likely known that he had these skills.

Fortunately, obtaining gate passes to leave the settlement is relatively easy for those who live near the refugee office and there is a market for casual labor. However, the casual labor market is less than ideal. For example, not all Angolans have access to casual labor, they report receiving lower wages than their Zambian counterparts, some employers do not pay, or employers say that they will pay later. Some youth reported having walked several days to engage in casual labor and then the employer did not pay them. In other cases, they may pay with in-kind items, usually food, and not cash that could be used to pay for school or clinic fees.

**Skills Training.** Only 43 percent of those interviewed individually, and 25 percent of those in groups, reported having received skills training in Zambia, with the highest numbers among those who arrived in the first wave of refugees and are in the 30-50 year age range. They have received training in agricultural, business management, carpentry, community mobilization, community school teaching, knitting, and sewing. Few could recall when they received the training, but believed it was funded by UNHCR, the Ministry of Community Development, NGOs, or churches.

Among those refugees trained, very few had the opportunity to use their new skills for financial gain or employment. For example, refugees who had been trained in business management were not provided access to credit to start a business and those who learned to sew have not had access to sewing machines, thus they have not been able to apply the skills they gained through training.

## Feeling at Home

All the Angolans interviewed have been in Zambia for more than 10 years. It was not surprising to find that most of those in the settlements feel welcome in Zambia and live like Zambians. Many were born in Zambia and have never been to Angola. Others have married a Zambian and have raised children and grandchildren in Zambia and have established their lives there. Many say that they do not wish to repatriate because there is nothing in Angola for them – no family, no land, and no jobs. Some still do not believe it is safe to return.

The majority of self-settled Angolans interviewed indicated a preference to return to Angola. They feel more pressure from the Zambian communities that land is not as available as it used to be and they know that they have no legal status which leaves them vulnerable to the Zambian immigration officials. They want to move away from sustenance and they do not see any services in Zambia that will assist them to progress economically. They hope for a better life in Angola. However, some stay in Zambia because they do not have the funds to return, or want to stay longer so their children can learn English, or they do not want to disrupt the school cycle for their children.

While all the Angolans interviewed continue to speak their mother tongues, they have added new languages and there are no language barriers.

**Safety and Security.** A majority of the former Angolan refugees feel safe in Zambia. While there is petty theft, beatings, killings, defilement, and rape, the incidence of such crimes is low and likely similar to their host communities. Those in the settlements generally understand that the process for reporting crime includes the neighborhood watch committees, the sector/block leaders, the refugee officers, and the police. The level of trust of the police is high and the Angolans have confidence that they are there to serve and protect them.

The self-settled Angolans feel less safe. In addition to a constant fear of exportation because of lack of documentation, some also report being called names and suffering other forms of discrimination such as less or no pay for casual labor.

**Housing.** Another success factor in social integration is that the refugees live in housing similar to their host communities. Although some Angolans in Mayukwayukwa and Meheba have homes that consist of cement walls, iron sheeting roofs, windows, and doors, the majority live in semi-permanent structures constructed of mud and thatched roofs. These are similar patterns to the homes they had in Angola and similar to what the Zambians in the area have. For the most part, the Angolans built their own homes with materials that are readily available and none of them pay rent to live in them.

**Social Connections.** The cultural and linguistic ties between the two groups have contributed to the ease with which the Angolans have integrated with the Zambians in their host communities. They are able to communicate effectively as they socialize with them. The Angolans report that they mix freely with Zambians, attend church and school together, celebrate holidays with them, play sports together, and intermarry. While most Angolans interviewed feel socially integrated, there are some incidences of discrimination particularly among the second wave of Angolans. For example, the Angolans who arrived in the late 1990s and early 2000s are predominantly from the

Umbundu ethnic group and thus are seen as supporters of the former UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the UNITA party. Because of others assuming this association, they are viewed as more violent and they are feared to be a group that will cause political upheaval both in Zambia and Angola.

It should be noted that the evaluation team did not interview Zambians outside the host communities, so this report is limited on how self-settled Angolans have integrated and cannot judge how well the government-settled Angolans will integrate once they are granted full freedom of movement under the local integration program.

## **Equality Between Angolans and Zambian Host Community**

Among the Angolans and the Zambians in the host community, there are no noted feelings of inequality. And if feelings of inequality exist, they are not intense. Nevertheless, there are some ways in which Angolans do not have equal privileges, i.e., they do not have freedom of movement, they cannot work in the formal job sector, and they cannot vote.

**Pathway to Citizenship.** A system is in place to provide documentation to Angolans for major life events, such as birth and death, which provides the foundation for a subsequent pathway to citizenship. It is not a perfect system – for either the refugees or citizens – but in most cases when babies are born in clinics or hospitals, the birth is registered and birth certificates are provided within a reasonable time of the event. The same is true for death certificates. However, if births or deaths happen at home, the likelihood of a certificate being issued is reduced significantly. The Angolans did not report feeling cheated in any way because of this, which may be attributed to the fact that they are rarely if ever required to produce a birth or death certificate. In fact, birth certificates are not even required to register a child for school, which helps prevent parents being deterred from registering children for school.

All Angolans in the settlements were given UNHCR refugee cards and in some cases this is their only form of identification. Unfortunately, many no longer have their UNHCR card and are without any form of identification. And although the cards are no longer valid given that the Angolans are no longer classified as refugees, they are important cards to have in case the Angolans wish to repatriate or apply for permanent residency. (For those who have lost their UNHCR cards, it might be possible to verify their status through the existing database.) Some Angolans have taken advantage of the opportunity to buy an alien card for 51 Kwacha, which is approximately ten US dollars, as an additional form of identification. However, this is cost-prohibitive for many Angolans who barely have the means to feed their families. Others question the efficacy of the alien cards based on stories of immigration officers issuing fines of 3,000 Kwacha to Angolans who show the alien card as their only form of identification.

In December 2012, the Government of the Republic of Zambia established a pathway to citizenship for 10,000 Angolans by offering permanent residency and the opportunity to apply for citizenship ten years from the date of receiving the permanent residency status. This is discussed in greater detail below in the section “Alternative Legal Status.”

**Freedom of Movement.** The Refugee Convention stipulates, and UNHCR encourages, freedom of movement. This generally means that once refugees are in their country of first asylum they should be free to move around the country without limits. This is not the case in Zambia and gate passes are required to leave both the Mayukwayukwa and Meheba settlements. Refugees and former refugees must obtain a gate pass from the refugee officer. The Angolans who participated in the evaluation consistently reported that the gate passes are easy to get. Despite how easy it is to get a gate pass, some avoid them because it is too far to walk to reach the refugee officer and others believe they are not necessary unless they are traveling far away from the settlements like Lusaka, for example. The gate passes are considered valid anywhere in Zambia and the duration of the pass depends on the reason for requesting it, but can range from several weeks to several months.

Of course, the self-settled Angolans do not have the same type of restrictions on their movement. However, as they move around, they fear being deported because of their lack of documentation. Living in this type of fear is difficult for the Angolans and makes it challenging for officials to locate them. It was for this reason that the evaluation team was not able to interview as many as was intended and makes it difficult to know the exact amount and location of the self-settled Angolans or any other refugees and persons of concern.

**Access to Services.** Both government and self-settled Angolans have full access to schools, clinics, and hospitals. Originally, the schools were free, but now fees are assessed through the parent – teacher associations. The clinics remain free for visits, but refugees are charged for lab work and medicine. The main barriers to schools and clinics are the walking distances and the fees. In the case of high schools, it can take up to three or four hours to reach the school by foot and costs up to 100 US dollars per term. So, while they are technically open to all those who live in the settlement, they are not completely accessible. The situation is much better for basic schools, as they are free or inexpensive and the distances between the schools are much shorter, but even three or four kilometers can be difficult for younger.

In Mayukwayukwa, the two main languages in the schools are English and Lozi, and in Meheba they are English and Kaonde (or kiiKaonde). This helps make the schools accessible to both Angolans and Zambians living in the area.

**Collaboration in Managing Settlements.** Providing opportunities for Angolans to collaborate in managing the settlements has helped them feel at home and feel equality with the Zambians. By being part of the decision-making process, like Zambians in community development committees, they are empowered and have some control over how their communities are managed. Elections are held routinely in the settlements and residents – both refugees and former refugees/persons of concern – can run for office. The top positions include chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary, and block/sector leaders. They are also involved in various committees for school, neighborhood watch, community development, and welfare. All these position are voluntary and unpaid.

## **Host Government and Host Community Welcoming**

The Government of the Republic of Zambia has a long-standing reputation as being welcoming and generous to refugees. During the peak in 2003, Zambia hosted 227,000 refugees. Many of the

Angolans have since repatriated and by the end of 2013, Zambia was hosting just more than 53,000 refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, and various other countries, including former refugees/persons of concern from Angola and Rwanda. About 65 percent of the 23,244 Angolans live in the two settlements – Mayukwayukwa and Meheba – and others are spread out over 28 districts in five provinces.

**Host Government Refugee Policies.** The role of the host government in supporting the local integration efforts has been critical in the case of Zambia. The GRZ has always welcomed refugees, has made it a safe place for them, and has laid the foundations for local integration, especially the opportunity for refugees to become self-sufficient. While some of their policies, as discussed below, are not ideal, the reality on the ground is that the government has been welcoming and generous with refugees, confirmed by their commitment to legally integrate 10,000 former refugees.

Several factors have shaped the government’s welcoming attitude towards refugees. Zambia’s independence in 1964 was achieved peacefully and the transition from British colonial rule to independent statehood was fairly smooth. Zambia assumed responsibility to welcome those in the region who were feeling conflicts and/or civil wars, especially those related to struggles for independence. Starting in 1966, Zambia started accepting refugees from Angola and let them spontaneously settle in communities near the border of Angola. Over the years, the practice of welcoming refugees has remained strong. In part, this is bound by tradition and the sense of responsibility toward their fellow Africans and caring for those who are less fortunate.

The practices of self-settling continued through the 1980s. It is estimated that there were 72,000 self-settled Angolan refugees by 1988. However, within a few years of the arrival of the first wave of Angolans, Zambia started implementing stricter laws and policies concerning refugees. In 1971, the Zambia Government created the Refugee Control Act, the name of which reveals the Zambian Government’s desire to exercise greater control over the refugees they continued to welcome, and included designating areas where refugees would be required to settle. The main reason for creating the settlements was a concern about safety and security. Specifically they feared that allowing refugees to live near the border in close proximity to warring factions and rebels could lead to their direct involvement in the conflict. There were additional concerns with regard to absorption capacity of border villages and access to livelihoods since the northwest border areas of Zambia are known to be the poorest and least developed. Related is the concern that the refugees were depleting natural resources, such as wildlife, fish, and timber.

The 1971 Refugee Control Act included the following:

1. All refugees must be registered with the Government of Zambia
2. All refugees must live in Government designated settlements
3. All refugees must have identity cards
4. Refugees are denied the right to citizenship
5. The government will provide health, and social services, access to land and access to livelihood programs in order to assist refugees to become self-sufficient

After passage of the Act, the government attempted to round-up self-settled Angolans and transport them to the settlements, but it was not until the late 1980s that the Refugee Control Act was put into full implementation. The development of government settlement schemes along with the determination of Angolan refugees to self-settle, generated two distinct refugee populations in Angola: self-settled refugees and “scheme-settled” refugees who are registered and engaged in government refugee programs and reside in government created settlements. Self-settled refugees do not register and consequently, their exact numbers are unknown. They purposefully avoided participating in government-run refugee programs knowing that if they did, they would be forced to live in a “scheme settlement.” By 1988, the Government of Zambia focused on assuring that refugees would only settle in government schemes. Refugees living in government-run settlements received shelter, food, livelihood assistance, security, and access to land. The Zambian Government wanted the refugee populations to become as self-sufficient as possible. Schools and health services are also provided for the “scheme-settled” refugee populations (Powles: 1992–1993:4–6).

The Government of Zambia collaborated with UNHCR and non-government organizations, such as CARE International and the Catholic Secretariat, to manage and provide protection and services to refugees in the settled schemes. For all “scheme settlements,” the Government of Zambia organized and managed refugee registration and placement, safety and security issues, and medical and educational services. UNHCR served as a technical and protection advisor, while the NGOs performed necessary food distribution and other programming in regard to livelihoods and informal and vocational education programs. While provided with an assortment of assistance that improves the quality of their lives, refugees in scheme settlements have little chance of developing a life outside of the settlements since the government restricts their freedom of movement. A refugee must be issued a gate pass from a government official in the settlement in order to leave the settlement. The gate passes are valid for up to 60 days in order to engage in casual labor, visit family, go to other markets, or attend school. Refugees in Zambia can also obtain permission and the necessary travel documents to travel internationally but it is a cumbersome process (Powles: 1992–1993:4–6).

However, with ever greater influxes of refugees that continued to arrive between 1988 through 2002, the second wave, the Government of Zambia mandated that all refugees were required to live in refugee settlements. By the end of the long and bloody civil war in 2002, it was estimated that there were more than 188,000 Angolan refugees in Zambia (UNHCR Zambia Report 2002 and 2003). Half were living in Zambian government settlements and half had integrated into local communities where they received little to no assistance.

By 2001, in response to the new flow of Angolan and other refugees, the Zambian Government conceptualized and piloted the Zambian Initiative, which was officially launched in August 2002. This initiative was a government led “plan to coordinate donors’ efforts in reducing poverty, linking relief and development assistance, and contributing to peace and stability in refugee-hosting areas of Zambia.” This plan was designed to coordinate development assistance for both refugee and host country populations. In addition, within this plan, the Zambian Government announced that it would modify its refugee law and allow long-term refugees to apply for citizenship (UNHCR Zambia Initiative Launched: August 27, 2002).

From 2009–2012, voluntary repatriation of Angolans remained the chief priority, although the Zambian Government continued to support local integration as well. The cessation of refugee status for the Angolans came into effect on June 30, 2012. Angolans residing in Zambia after that date are subject to the immigration laws of Zambia. By December 2012, the Zambian Government agreed to grant permanent residency status to 10,000 Angolans who meet the criteria and is currently implementing this policy (UNHCR 31 Dec 2012).

**Local Population’s Acceptance of Refugees.** When the host community is open and welcoming to the refugees, the local integration process is much smoother. In the case of Zambia, the three host communities visited as part of this evaluation are all welcoming, but to slightly different degrees. The strongest support is in the community where the chief is most supportive and, not surprisingly, the community that has some reservations about hosting the Angolans is where the chief has reservations. This highlights the important role of the traditional leadership in successful integration of Angolans. The three chiefs that were interviewed expressed a desire to be provided with more routine updates on the local integration program and to be involved in decisions that will affect the populations in their chiefdoms.

There are several explanations for why the host communities have been so accepting of the Angolan refugees:

1. **Commonalities** – In both the Western and Northwestern Provinces, the Zambians in the host community and the Angolans share a common heritage, traditions, religions, and languages. This has made it quite easy for the Angolans to assimilate. In fact, many report that it is often difficult to tell the difference between the Angolans and Zambians.
2. **Angolans’ attitudes** - The Angolans have been well accepted in the host communities because they have shown respect for the traditional leaders and members of the host community. They have been peaceful, cooperative, and friendly, thus minimizing the potential friction between the two groups.
3. **Zambian’s attitudes** – With very few exceptions, those interviewed spoke of their commitment and responsibility to host the Angolans, referring to African unity and brotherhood. They understand it was not the fault of the Angolans that there were forced to flee to Zambia and that they deserve a peaceful existence, just as the Zambians enjoy.
4. **Benefits to host community** – It is not unusual to find jealousy and resentment in host communities because the refugees receive donor assistance and have better access to services. The GRZ and UNHCR have handled this well from the beginning, ensuring that the host communities benefit from the resources and services available to the refugees, i.e., schools and clinics. Now UNHCR is funding Quick Impact Projects in the host communities. The communities are aware why they are getting these projects – fish farming, poultry, beekeeping, and rehabilitation of classrooms – and are grateful for them.

Another benefit is that the Zambians have learned a lot from having Angolans as their neighbors. Through the social and economic integration, Angolans have reportedly taught Zambians new things about carpentry, brick making, farming, including introducing new crops into their communities and how to grow some crops at a larger scale, beekeeping, and business.



### Lessons Learned from the Zambia Initiative

In 2006, an evaluation revealed the following lessons that were learned from the successes and challenges of the Zambia Initiative, many of which can be applied to other efforts to promote development through local integration.

1. It is critical to involve the communities – refugees and host communities – starting from the initial planning stages and throughout the process, especially in dealing with those elements that most directly affect the communities. In this process care should be taken not to create unrealistic expectations of the program.
2. Having a comprehensive strategic plan or framework document is helpful in guiding the process and ensuring that all the individual components are complementary in achieving the program's objectives.
3. The framework document must clearly state the objectives, prescribe indicators, and require a monitoring and reporting system that includes baseline data.
4. Ensuring that the program is well integrated with the government's development plan is important, but must also be integrated with district and line ministry plans. In an ideal world the program would also be integrated with UNDP's program and the development programs of key partner governments.
5. Roles of all stakeholders should be clarified from the beginning and reviewed occasionally.
6. Strong support for the concept does not always translate into sufficient donations to fund the effort, so contingency plans should be in place, such as a pilot program or staged approach.
7. Is important to ensure a steady flow of funding both from donor sources – which is a challenge given the one-year funding of UNHCR and partner governments – and out to implementing partners.
8. The capacity of program implementers must be realistically assessed and then properly trained, given appropriate control over the required resources, and monitored regularly.

One concern that came from a number of people was that the Angolans had depleted many of the natural resources in the area, including timber, fish, and wild animals that were living in the bush. While there was no resulting conflict, there is clearly lingering resentment over this issue and concern that they may continue to be a drain on the natural resources in the area. A funded program, either by the GRZ or partner governments, to restore these natural resources will not only improve the environment, but will also strengthen the relationships as the Angolans integrate more into the host communities and resettlement areas.

There is also minor concern that when the Angolans gain legal status that they will also gain political power. It should be noted, however, that it will be challenging for 10,000 Angolans to form a critical mass because they are spread over two very large settlements and throughout five provinces and 28 districts. In addition, it will take at least 10 years for them to be citizens, further limiting their ability to have a critical mass of political influence.

## Diplomatic and Programmatic Interventions

The final factor in the successful local integration of refugees is the programmatic and diplomatic support of UNHCR and partner governments. In the cases of Zambia, UNHCR has been heavily involved with the Angolan population and their support continues as they see the Angolans through the final stages of local integration. Partner governments, such as the US, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Germany have been particularly interested in the local integration strategy and have provided encouragement to GRZ and UNHCR in their pursuit of the strategy.

**UNHCR Diplomatic Support.** In UNHCR's role to coordinate the provision of protection and assistance, they have had a continuous presence in Zambia since the first wave of Angolans arrived in Zambia in 1966. UNHCR enjoys a warm and collaborative relationship with the GRZ's Commission of Refugees within the Ministry of Home Affairs. UNHCR also takes a proactive role in facilitating relationships between the GRZ and partner donor governments, including hosting site visits to the settlements, meetings, and updates.

Over the last 10-15 years, their diplomatic efforts have focused increasingly on durable solutions including local integration with the following key activities:

1. **Zambia Initiative 2002** – The Zambia Initiative, launched in 2002, was a government-led Development through Local Integration (DLI) project that focused on the needs of host communities in the Western Province and included the refugees in the Mayukwayukwa and Nangweshi settlements. According to the proposal for the initiative, the objectives were: “(1) Poverty reduction of refugees and their local hosting communities through community reconstruction, increase of food production, fighting environmental degradation and improvement of basic social services and living standards; and (2) creating an environment conducive for refugees to become productive members of the host communities, leading to social integration, peace, security and stability in Western Province.” The budget for this effort was \$25 million for three years, but only \$15 million was contributed by the governments of Denmark, Japan, the US, Sweden, plus contributions from ECHO/UNICEF, UNHCR, and the Zambian government.
2. **Comprehensive Strategy 2009** – In October 2009, UNHCR announced a “comprehensive strategy to bring to a proper closure the Angolan refugee situation. The strategy comprised four components: (a) enhancing promotion of voluntary repatriation and reintegration of Angolan refugees in Angola; (b) pursuing opportunities for local integration or alternative legal status in countries of asylum; (c) continuing to meet the needs of those individuals unable to return to their country of origin for protection-related reasons; and (d) elaborating a common schedule leading to the cessation of refugee status” (UNHCR Zambia, 15 Jan 2012).
3. **Local Integration Strategy 2014** – UNHCR has provided the GRZ’s Ministry of Home Affairs with diplomatic and technical support in conducting assessments and developing the Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia, which was officially released in January 2014. The strategy, which is discussed in greater detail below, includes three pillars: alternative legal status, an integrated resettlement program, and advocacy for refugee affected areas.

**UNCHR Programmatic Support.** Over the past 15 years, UNHCR had the following budget, offices, and staff. Also indicated on the table are the numbers of people assisted by UNHCR, which includes all refugees, persons of concern, and asylum seekers of all nationalities.

Year	Budget (USD in millions)	Offices/Staff	Persons of Concern (all nationalities)	Persons of Concern Served by UNHCR (all nationalities)
2000	12.6	5/55	250,600	116,360
2001	13.7	5/83	282,640	144,700
2002	20.2	5/109	246,100	142,530
2003	18.6	5/not reported	226,900	134,300
2004	16.5	5/106	173,000	94,100
2005	13.6	5/101	155,800	75,400
2006	18.3	not reported/99	120,500	64,800
2007	11.8	4/63	112,930	59,290
2008	13.0	4/74	83,480	53,410
2009	16.5	4/63	56,810	35,150

2010	12.3	4/66	48,160	6,880
2011	14.1	4/63	45,520	28,620
2012	17.9	3/51	43,330	29,760
2013	14.9	not reported	52,306	not reported

\*source: UNHCR Global Reports 2000-2010, Global Appeal 2011-2013

UNHCR in Zambia has funded the full range of activities including community services, crop production, environmental, domestic, education, food, forestry, health and nutrition, income generation, legal assistance, livestock, sanitation, shelter and other infrastructure, transport, and water. While many of these have addressed basic protection and assistance needs, others have helped the refugees to integrate social and economically.

With the formal local integration program now underway, UNCHR and partner governments will have the opportunity to provide programmatic support. Donor governments will have the opportunity to contribute to the 3-year, \$20.9 million program. (Detailed budget is provided below.)

**Partner Governments' Support.** The requirement for diplomatic intervention from partner governments has been minimal up to this point and there are no major barriers anticipated in pursuit of the local integration program for which diplomatic intervention may be required. The Zambian government and the Angolan government are fully committed and are providing resources for the first pillar of the program, which focuses on the documentation required to issue residency permits. Although donor governments are not interested in funding the first pillar of the program, they should continue to show their support to both governments and act only if the commitment of either governments wane.

Partner governments will, however, need to be active supporters in terms of development programming for the local integration program to succeed. Based on the information currently available, the main barrier anticipated is the funding to fully cover the \$20.9 million budget for the program. Canada has already stepped forward and committed \$3 million.

The Angolan government has also been a strong partner in this process. In terms of the first pillar, they are taking full responsibility for providing the former Angolan refugees with all the documentation required by the Zambian government, which includes national registration cards and passports. There is full confidence that both governments will keep their commitments to provide the documentation, but the Angolan process is currently moving slowly. To expedite the process, larger teams assigned to work in Zambia will be required.

Other governments, such as Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Germany, are supportive of local integration as a durable solution.

## **B. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

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### **Alternative Legal Status**

While the Angolans are integrated economically and socially, the next step is to become legally integrated. This process began in December 2012 with the GRZ offering permanent residency to 10,000 Angolans who will then be eligible for citizenship in ten years. The GRZ reduced the price of the residency permit and UNHCR is covering the remaining costs. The estimated budget for covering these costs is \$2.7 million.

Those who receive residency permits will have legal protection and all the rights and responsibilities as Zambian nationals except they will not be allowed to vote. They will have the right to work, but they must declare changes in occupation to the Department of Immigration.

One of the following criteria must be met to qualify for local integration:

1. Children of citizens of Zambia (a child born to at least one Zambian parent)
2. Angolans married to Zambian nationals (with spouse permit can apply for residence permit after five years)
3. Intend to invest or establish a business (with investors permit can apply for residence permit after three years of operating viable business)
4. Professional employment (with employment permit can apply for residency after ten years)
5. Long stay/continuous residence (refugees who arrived between 1966 and 1986 can immediately apply for this residency)
6. Second and subsequent generation refugees (children and grandchildren of refugees who arrived between 1966 and 1986 can immediately apply for residency)
7. Former Angolan refugees married to refugees of other nationalities (considered on a case-by-case basis to promote the principle of family unity)

Most of the issues that the evaluation team was made aware of are related to fifth criteria: long stay/continuous stay:

1. Those who qualify in the settlements have already applied or are planning to apply.
2. The self-settled Angolans who qualify expressed more interest in repatriating than applying for local integration. (It must be noted that the sample size was small and involved four focus groups in one community, none of whom knew anything about the local integration program before the evaluation team provided a brief explanation.)
3. Those who do not qualify in the settlements, and who do not wish to repatriate, are extremely unhappy. They feel that they have stayed in Zambia for a long time and have established homes and businesses. They do not understand why they are being discriminated against and are anxious about what will happen to them. One ineligible Angolan's anxiety level is so high that he fears his house will be burned if he does not repatriate. This is certainly an unanticipated negative consequence of the local integration program and could easily be fixed by allowing all former Angolan refugees to apply for residency regardless of their date of entry to Zambia as a refugee.

Based on the history of welcoming refugees, it is unlikely that the Zambian government will deport the ineligible Angolans. However, it is not clear if these former Angolan refugees will be allowed to stay where they are currently living, whether it is in the area that will continue to be designated for refugees or in the area designed for the local integration program. No matter where they live, the situation is confusing and does not provide them with any clear path to citizenship, integration, or return.

Those who qualify must apply with the GRZ. After that, they must secure the required documentation from the GRA, which includes a National Registration Card (NRC) and Angolan passport. At an August 2013 tripartite meeting, the GRA is providing these documents at no cost to the former Angolan refugees. They have also sent a team from the Ministry of Justice to both settlements to collect the information for the NRCs and they are now in the process of distributing the cards. The next step will be to send a team from the Ministry of Interior's Immigration Department to issue passports.

The eligible Angolans who were interviewed as part of this evaluation reported that they have full confidence that they will get their NRCs sometime in 2014, but indicated that the process is moving very slowly. It should be noted that while they are waiting, the only form of identification most have is their UNHCR refugee cards, which are not valid or they have no identification at all. They have the opportunity to obtain alien cards, but have difficulty paying for them and question their efficacy, as discussed above. Without valid identification, they are vulnerable. Partner governments also indicated that the process was moving slowly, but were not surprised given the situation. Their confidence in the local integration program will increase once the documentation phase is completed.

An unintended positive consequence of the documentation process is that the GRA's outreach to Angolans in Zambia has increased the former refugees' confidence in their government and increased their desire to return to Angola. This is true even among those who qualify for local integration. Another positive consequence is that after obtaining a passport, the former Angolan refugees will finally have the full freedom of movement that is a fundamental right expressed in the Geneva Conventions, allowing them to travel internationally and to return to Angola should they decide to repatriate in the future. Most importantly, the Angolan passport and national identification card provides them the documentation and proof of full citizenship, thus legal status and protection during their 10-year wait for Zambian citizenship. This important passport/ID process eliminates the chance of these Angolans being stateless or in a long-term temporary status which has been a main vulnerability of refugees in other protracted situations like in Tanzania, Uganda, and the Balkans.

As of February 2014, around 6,000 Angolans in the two settlements have applied for the local integration program. The GRZ believes that most of those who are eligible have applied and that their applications will be accepted. To reach the target of 10,000, the GRZ has three options:

1. Reach out to the self-settled who arrived in Zambia between 1966 and 1986. This will be challenging because it is difficult to locate them and they hide from officials because they fear being deported.
2. Expand the criteria to include Angolans who arrived between 1966 and 2002 and continue focusing on the settlements. This is logistically easier and has the advantage of minimizing

the potential conflicts that may arise among the ineligible Angolans living in the settlements.

3. Allow all Angolans, regardless of when they arrived or how they settled, to obtain an Angolan passport and either return to Angolan at their discretion or apply for local integration. While this option will require more resources, it will provide legal protection for all Angolans living in Zambia, will ensure that they are not left stateless, and will mitigate the rising tensions among those who are currently ineligible for local integration.

Despite the evaluation findings, the GRZ has expressed preference for the first option, which it seems is based on pressures from traditional leaders in chiefdoms not adjacent to the settlements. The GRZ believes there are sufficient numbers of self-settled Angolans who wish to apply for local integration and is likely to pursue this option. If pursued, this option would require more robust GRZ teams to work with the GRZ and an information campaign that states that there is amnesty for the lack of documentation and “illegal” settlement into the villages.

Another key finding regarding the documentation component of the local integration program is that complete and accurate information has not been provided to the former Angolan refugees or to the traditional leadership in the host communities. In the case of Mayukwayukwa, Angolans in Shibanga, the area designed for resettlement, had very little information about the local integration program. They have no idea that their refugee area is set to be part of the local integration resettlement scheme, thus they are not aware that they may have to move or that the Angolans moving to that area are part of a citizenship process. In fact, some had never heard of it. On the other hand, Angolans in Meheba, especially Block H, had misinformation about the program. Their understanding was that if they did not qualify for local integration, they would be forced to repatriate without notice. They are now living in fear that they will be thrown in a truck and be taken to Angola against their will. Those who qualify believe that there is an annual fee for a residency permit and that they will have to pay the high fee (10,000 Kwacha or about \$1,800) after the first five years of the ten year waiting period. This misunderstanding is particularly stressful to those with large families.

The traditional leaders in the surrounding chiefdoms have some accurate information, but they expressed a desire for routine updates on the process and the role of the chiefdoms. They also expressed the desire to participate on the future governance of the new settlement scheme areas to assure peaceful co-existence and collaboration.

## **Integrated Resettlement Program**

The second pillar of the local integration program is the Integrated Resettlement Program. This will provide the opportunity for former refugees with residence permits to live alongside an equal number of Zambians and have access to land for housing and farming, as well as access to basic services consistent with national standards. Angolans with residence permits have the option of moving anywhere in Zambia, but it is expected that the majority will choose to live in the resettlement area.

In each of the two settlements, a portion of the land will be designated for the resettlement program, while the remainder of the area will continue to serve refugees. The process of designating land

for the resettlement program is now in progress and involves land “de-gazetting,” demarcation, and numbering the plots. De-gazetting is rezoning and re-registering the land as land for a new village population and taking it off the land gazetted as a refugee settlement area only. The GRZ will also conduct soil capability surveys and give consideration to existing farm plots, housing, roads, and other infrastructure.

Upon receiving residency permits, the Angolans can start farming. After two years of successful farming, they will have the opportunity, just as the Zambians have, to acquire a title deed to the land. The cost of the deeds ranges from US \$400-\$800, depending on the size of the plot. The budget for the program includes US \$2.2 million to help defray the costs of the deeds, but the program is likely to end before the 2-year wait period is completed for most of the Angolans. Thus, if the GRZ and UNHCR commit to defraying the costs this will need to be appropriately transitioned to the Land Commission and have a formal written agreement that the Land Commission will respect the lowered costs in the years to come.

This land will come with start-up farm inputs consisting of free fertilizer, fertilizer at subsidized prices through cooperatives, free rice seeds, and maize seed and sorghum free with the purchase of the subsidized fertilizer. Although it is not part of the package, the Angolans expressed concern about the tools required to clear the bush for cultivating. The plan includes formation of 20 cooperatives and that each one will be provided with animal draft power to help cultivate the land, so this may help address their concerns. The budget for the agriculture component is US \$2 million. The program also includes:

1. Education – Rehabilitation of at least two basic schools in each of the two resettlement areas to include all the facilities to meet the Ministry of Education guidelines (\$1.75 million)
2. Primary health – Construction or rehabilitation of one health center in each of the two areas (\$1 million)
3. Roads and bridges – Rehabilitation of gravel roads to facilitate access to and circulation within the two resettlement areas (\$1.25 million)
4. Markets – Construction of two new markets and shops in each settlement (\$0.5 million)
5. Housing – Contribution to the construction of low-cost housing units with 25% contribution by owners of households; package includes cement, two windows, two doors, but no roofing materials (\$4.12 million)
6. Electricity and water – Construction of 60 new water points, possible rehabilitation of a mini turbine power generation station in Shibanga (the resettlement area of Mayukwayukwa) (\$1.36 million)
7. Vocational training and microfinance – Accreditation with TEVETA approved institutions, training of selected individuals at trade schools (fees, tools, and capital), certification of graduates, provision of tools and equipment to graduates, and some start-up funds for those who present sound business plans (\$1 million)
8. Program Management and Monitoring/Evaluation (\$1.93 million)

While the offer of additional land is generous and welcome, it does require that a majority Angolans who qualify for the local integration program to move to an area designated for the program. This is being met by resistance of some who have established homes, farms, and

businesses after living in the settlements for many decades. Specifically, they expressed the following concerns about being relocated:

1. Housing – Angolans expressed concern about leaving the homes they built themselves and constructing new ones. Those who own permanent structures asked if they would be compensated for the homes that would be left for someone else to occupy. Some were worried that they would not be able to come up with the 25 percent cost-share for a permanent structure when all they can currently afford is a mud hut with a thatched roof.
2. Businesses – The Angolans with businesses asked what would happen to their current business and if they would have access to credit for starting a new business (the proposed plan does not include a credit program).
3. Farming – Based on the responses in the evaluation, it became apparent that not all the Angolans are prepared to cultivate plots that may be at least four times as large as they have been to cultivating. Some, but not all, understand they will have the opportunity to plant new crops (that they may have no experience with), harvest larger quantities that they may sell (but may not have sufficient access to markets), or rotate their crops to maintain the fertility of the soil (they have developed a dependence on chemical fertilizers). The program includes a plan to include the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) to work with former refugees in the new settlements to boost productivity.
4. Timing – The Angolans who have applied for local integration are concerned about the timing of the move and are currently in limbo. They hope they are not required to move before harvesting their current crops and unsure if they should plant for the next season. They also are concerned about whether the timing of the move will interrupt their children's studies.
5. Availability of basic services – They are concerned about whether basic services and infrastructure will be in place before the move. Their biggest concerns are about water, schools, and clinics.
6. Infrastructure – They recognize that they will be moving to a less developed area and are concerned about roads, bridges, markets, and cell phone coverage. While roads, bridges, and markets are part of the program, the GRZ will need to coordinate with the private sector to extend cell phone service to these areas to increase access to inputs and markets that will strengthen their economic integration.
7. Access to credit – The program includes start-up funds for individuals who present sound business plans, but it is not clear if this will be a robust enough program to meet the credit needs of those who will want to start new businesses, buy the inputs needed for the larger plots of land, or build houses.

As indicated above, there are Angolans living in the resettlement area who do not qualify for local integration and do not wish to repatriate. They are concerned about where they will live and if the access to services will continue for them. Some interviewed have already experienced being rejected at the medical clinic, being told that they no longer qualify for assistance.

There are two issues that did not surface in the interviews with the former Angolan refugees or the host communities, but were addressed with other key informants. The first issue is related to the layout of the resettlement areas and assurance that minimum standards will be met in terms of proximity to water, clinics, and schools. The on-going GRZ resettlement program includes two



models: (a) housing is centrally located along with service centers and families walk to their farm plots and (b) houses are located on part of the farm land and families walk to the service centers which can be 10-12 kilometers away and do not meet the minimum standards for distance from basic services such as water points, clinics and schools. While the first option is more cost effective for the government, the evaluation team was told that in the past, Zambians who participate in the other GRZ resettlement programs prefer the second option because of increased privacy and desire to have their farm animals nearby. No attempt has been made yet to understand the needs and preferences of the Angolans or of the Zambians who qualify to resettle.

The second issue is related to governance. The evaluation team understands that the two proposed resettlement areas will follow the same structure of governance as the existing GRZ-managed resettlement areas, which is under the authority of the district and provincial authorities rather than traditional leaders. The team was unaware of any efforts so far to address this issue with those who have been managing the settlements, including UNHCR, implementing partners, or the former refugees who are in a position to raise issues that may be particular to the local integration program. These issues include such things as the role of UNHCR in the resettlement area, interest in carrying over any of the committees that have worked well for the former refugees, or including Zambians who have no experience living near Angolans or any former refugees. There was no evidence that these issues have been addressed directly with traditional leaders either. Traditional leaders have played a role with the Angolans in Zambia and would expect that to continue. The transition of governance needs to be clear to minimize conflict or tensions between populations both within the resettlement scheme area and for the surrounding villages. Paying attention to governance could mitigate unnecessary tensions.

## **Advocacy for Refugees in Affected Areas**

The third and final pillar of the local integration program includes providing assistance to refugee-affected areas including settlements and surrounding areas. The assistance is to support the local development plans and address the social, economic, and environmental impact of the prolonged presence of refugees. It is also intended to contribute to social harmony between the host communities and the former, current, and future refugees.

So far, UNHCR has funded six Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in the Kaoma and Solwezi districts, which have hosted refugees for decades. These projects include fish farming, poultry, beekeeping, and rehabilitation of classrooms. It is estimated that these QIPs will benefit around 54,000 Zambians.

Site visits were made to five of the six projects and interviews were conducted with the managers of the projects. The construction of the fish farms and poultry farms were complete, and the classrooms were nearing completion.

The projects appear to be managed well, despite the slow construction of the classrooms. The only concern was that there is no plan in place to monitor the reproduction of fish and chickens to ensure a continuous supply of new fish and to maintain the current production of eggs.

Based on an assessment done by a consultant developing the local integration strategy, the communities in the refugee areas have indicated the following priority development needs:

1. Improvements of access roads
2. Local economic development (agricultural inputs, storage facilities, markets)
3. Rehabilitation of health centers, ambulances, and communication services
4. Additional classrooms, teachers' houses, and other attendant facilities
5. Safe water and sanitation facilities
6. Employment and skills training for youth
7. Program to mitigate alcohol and substance abuse, HIV/AIDS, and GBV

## Funding Local Integration

The budget proposed for the local integration is \$20.9 million and is broken down as follows:

Pillar/Objective	Priority Area	2014 (USD)	2015 (USD)	2016 (USD)	Total (USD)	Govt Special	Govt Recurring
Alternative Legal Status: issuance of residency permits	1.1: ALS	1,350,000	1,350,000	0	2,700,000	0	0
Integrated Resettlement Program: access to land & basic services for Angolans and Zambians	2.1: Land	0	1,100,000	1,100,000	2,200,000	100,000	440,000
	2.2: Education	1,000,000	500,000	250,000	1,750,000	0	350,000
	2.3: Agriculture	1,267,750	773,250	0	2,043,000	0	408,600
	2.4: Health	740,356	257,644	0	998,000	0	199,600
	2.5: Roads & Bridges	871,212	151,515	227,273	1,250,000	0	250,000
	2.6: Markets	250,000	250,000	0	500,000	0	100,000
	2.7: Housing	1,648,000	1,648,000	824,000	4,120,000	0	824,000
	2.8: Electricity & Water	1,160,000	200,000	0	1,360,000	0	272,000
	2.9: Vocational	400,000	400,000	200,000	1,000,000	0	200,000
	2.10: PM & M/E	820,078	680,078	426,186	1,926,342	0	0
Refugee Assisted Areas: support local development plans; address impact of refugees on host communities	3.1: Education	100,000	250,000	0	350,000	0	
	3.2: Health	100,000	200,000	50,000	350,000		70,0000
	3.3: Roads & Bridges	200,000	100,000	100,000	400,000	0	80,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>9,909,396</b>	<b>7,310,487</b>	<b>3,177,459</b>	<b>20,947,342</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>3,364,200</b>

Funding for the Alternative Legal Status pillar is coming from the Zambian and Angolan governments, as well as UNHCR.

The bulk of the funding for the other two pillars will come from partner governments through UNHCR. The Canadian government has already contributed \$3 million toward the Integrated Resettlement Program. As in the case of Canada, the decisions for most other governments will be made in their headquarters and the funding will go directly to UNHCR's headquarters. It is unlikely that much of the funding will be bilateral.

While the final decisions regarding funding are made in headquarters, the embassies in Lusaka provide recommendations. The US embassy, for example, is reported to have been a reliable partner in the past and has shown great interest in the local integration program. However, the US embassy is more likely to recommend funding the local integration program once there is significant progress on the first pillar (alternative legal status).

An argument could be made that funding for the local integration program should come from development funds, i.e., UNDP, USAID, CIDA, SIDA, GIZ, etc. However, based on the interviews conducted with various embassies in Lusaka, this would be a hard sell. The development program budgets are stretched and there is never enough to address the development priorities throughout the rest of the country. In addition, development budgets are set well in advance and stretch over a 3-5 year (or longer) period, making it more difficult to add in other target locations or beneficiary groups. However, the GRZ could use its diplomatic influence when cooperating countries are designing new country strategies or new programs to ensure that the development priorities of the resettlement areas are integrated with the development priorities of the relevant districts and provinces.

As indicated in the chart above, the Zambian government will be covering recurring costs from the budgets of line ministries, as it does with the existing resettlement areas for Zambians. Some resistance is anticipated, as these budgets are already stretched and there are concerns about using scarce resources on Angolans rather than on its own citizens. The evaluation team is not aware of any proactive planning or discussions to mitigate this potential problem, but it is a significant concern to be addressed as the GRZ will need to cover the full costs of the resettlement areas once the UNHCR funding of the 3-year local integration program ends.

# CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## A. CONCLUSIONS

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Overall, the efforts of GRZ and UNHCR that have been made in Zambia since the arrival of the first wave of Angolan refugees in 1966 have resulted in a population of Angolans who have integrated well into Zambia, both socially and economically. The success in the social integration can be attributed, in part, to the shared cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties, but also to the welcoming attitudes of the Zambians toward the Angolans, the respect that the Angolans show for the culture and the traditional leadership of the Zambians, and the ease with which Angolans and Zambians mix socially. The economic integration has been facilitated by the GRZ's wisdom and generosity in providing access to land for the Angolans upon arrival in Zambia, as well as full access to schools and health clinics, and relative ease leaving the settlement for casual labor opportunities. Certainly the key factors have been in place for social and economic integration.

There is widespread confidence in the GRZ's commitment and capacity to provide a pathway to citizenship and therefore complete integration of the former Angolans in Zambia over the next few years. Similarly, the Angolan government is cooperating fully and is keeping their commitment to provide the required documentation free of charge to the former refugees. This documentation is a protection guarantee as it fully documents the Angolans' citizenship, allowing them freedom of movement not only within Zambia but internationally. Additionally, the GRZ's offer for larger plots of land, along with agricultural inputs, will help strengthen self-reliance for the Angolans.

The most significant potential barrier to successful implementation of the local integration program is securing sufficient resources to fund the program. There is also the potential for resistance from the former Angolans refugees who are eligible for local integration when they will be required to move out of the refugee area. The potential for resistance is even greater among the Angolans who do not wish to repatriate and are not eligible to live in the resettlement area and no longer qualified to live in the refugee settlement.

To address these issues and others raised in the findings, the evaluation team offers the recommendations below to increase the likelihood of success of Zambia's program to locally integrate the former Angolan refugees.

## B. RECOMMENDATIONS

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In terms of timing, the recommendations regarding documentation should be implemented immediately, as this component is now in progress, and the recommendations about information campaigns should also be given top priority; the other recommendations should be implemented in the next three to six months, assuming the local integration program stays on schedule. In terms of resources to implement the recommendations, for any actions directed toward the GRZ and GRA, it is recommended that these actions be funded by the respective governments. Additionally,

it is recommended that Donor Governments and UNHCR participate in funding the three-year local integration program, with a special focus on the basic infrastructure required.

### **Documentation/Alternative Legal Status**

1. GRZ should expand the *criteria for local integration* to include all Angolans, not just those who arrived between 1966 and 1986. This will help the GRZ to reach the target of 10,000 more cost-effectively than reaching out to self-settled refugees and better address the issues among refugees in settlements who do not currently qualify for local integration. It is preferable to open the offer to all Angolans, regardless of when they arrived or how they settled.
2. GRA should increase the *size of the teams* processing documentation to expedite the provision of National Registration Cards and passports so that the other components of the local integration program can move forward. Expediting the process will also increase the confidence of the former Angolan refugees and partner governments that are potential donors to the local integration program. UNHCR and partner governments should work with the GRA in Luanda to assure that they increase the number and size of the teams working on documentation.
3. GRZ should expedite the process of offering *Alien cards* to **all** former Angolan refugees, and possibly reduce the cost, so that they have a valid form of identification while waiting to complete the process for local integration or returning to Angola.
4. GRZ, working with UNHCR, should expedite their plans for an *information campaign* to provide full and accurate information about the documentation process, both verbally and in writing, so that the former refugees can make informed decisions about the opportunity for local integration or repatriating, and to ease their anxiety levels. The verbal and written communications should be in the major languages and outline all the currently known information, step-by-step and include frequently asked questions. Additional information can be presented in subsequent communications.

### **Relocating/Integrated Resettlement Program**

5. GRZ, in collaboration with UNHCR, should expand the *information campaign* to provide details about the plan for the “resettlement” area, plot sizes, agricultural packages, and the social services. The campaign should include community meetings where the former refugees are given the opportunity to provide input and feedback, especially about the layout of the resettlement area and the timing for moving to the area. GRZ and UNHCR should provide routine updates to traditional leaders in the area and provide opportunities for input and participation into this resettlement scheme process since traditional leaders play such a large role in local governance. The GRZ should take the lead in the information campaign to emphasize that it is a GRZ program and that UNHCR’s role with the former Angolan refugees is phasing out.

6. GRZ and UNHCR should ensure that all *basic infrastructure* is in place before any of the former refugees are required to move to the resettlement area. Donor Governments need to come forward with funding immediately to address the basic infrastructure needs, as Canada has. This will ease the anxiety of those who are concerned about moving into the bush, as they assume it is, and minimize the disruptions in school and health care, among other things.
7. GRZ should rethink the current plans for *housing* in the resettlement area, which includes providing cement, doors, and window (but no roof) and requires a 25 percent co-share with the former Angolan refugees, as well as the Zambians who will live in the resettlement area. In rethinking the plans, they should consult with Habitat for Humanity or other organizations that have successfully used approaches for community participation in designing and building houses in a rural setting. An ideal approach would reduce the anxiety among refugees about building a new house without the required resources and different from what they are accustomed to. The approach should also consider those refugees who are currently living in permanent structures that constructed with their own resources, but for which they have not written proof of ownership. Consideration should be given to providing documentation that provides proof of ownership and compensation for their investment and/or resources to construct a similar house in the resettlement area.
8. GRZ should network and coordinate with national and international NGOs that are currently implementing *credit schemes* in the provinces where the settlements are located.
9. GRZ should provide expanded *extension services* in the first few years of the local integration program. This will help both the Angolans and Zambians maximize the productivity of the land that they will be cultivating.
10. GRZ should start considering how they will approach the unique challenges of *governance* in the resettlement area. Careful consideration should be given to how to exit the role of UNHCR and increase or use traditional leaders appropriately. It is also worth considering the community-driven development approach that was pioneered by the World Bank, USAID, and others, and subsequently adapted by IRC for post conflict situations. See Attachment C for IRC's manual.

### **Advocacy for Refugee Affected Areas**

11. UNCHR should work with host communities to establish a system for monitoring the reproduction of fish, chickens, and bees that are part of the Quick Impact Projects. The benefiting community should provide the resources for the monitoring system to ensure that there is a continuous source of new fish, chickens and/or bees as current populations are either harvested or naturally die out.

### **Recommended Practices from Zambia for other Countries considering Local Integration**

Local integration successes and practices are largely dependent on the political, social, and economic environment of the host country and the country of origin of protracted refugee

situations. The national laws, cultural differences, the historical events, and the reason for the original conflict that caused the refugee situation are so varied from one region to another. These variations have an effect on how local integration can or cannot be implemented. Therefore, recommended practices for local integration from one protracted refugee situation to another is limited. Nevertheless, the evaluation team highlights the following practices from GRZ and GRA that can apply to current or future local integration programs.

12. Provide a national identification card and passport from the refugees' country of origin. Providing this necessary identification guarantees full protection and no risk of statelessness or temporary "in limbo" status for the refugees. This process should include:
  - Diplomatic efforts and dialogue to get both the country of origin and host country to agree to implement and fund this identification process;
  - An agreement between the country of origin and the host country that this is a necessary process for the full protection of the protracted refugees and/or refugees who have recently been declared non-refugees through the cessation clause; and
  - A guarantee from both country of origin and host country that the identification process is for protection and the fundamental right to citizenship and not to be used for *refoulement* (the forcing of the refugees to return to their country of origin).
  - A permanent residency status with a guarantee of the eventual right to apply for citizenship with the host country, following host country's citizenship laws
  - The necessary resources to implement the outreach and the bureaucratic mechanism and process to document, produce and distribute the identifications for the concerned refugee populations. These resources may need international donor support, if the country of origin and/or the host country are not able to fully fund this effort.
13. Provide designated areas of land and allocate land for both the refugees and host country citizens to settle and form a new community or expand an existing community. This is especially relevant when the refugees predominantly rely on agricultural livelihoods. It is preferable that this land be near the area where refugees originally settled, which will allow for greater integration, as the refugees will already be known by these communities. This type of program would require:
  - Funding for creating or expanding necessary infrastructure, such as schools, health clinics, electricity, roads, telephone network, etc.; funds would come from the host country and/or appeals to donor governments;
  - An approach that includes full community involvement, including participation from the refugees and host community that will occupy this land; and
  - A well-thought out governance structure to assure protection, civil access to government services like any other community, and has no conflict with the cultural and/or traditional governance structures within the host community.



## **ATTACHMENT A: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND DOCUMENTS CONSULTED**

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### **LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

#### **Government of the Republic of Zambia**

1. Amos Malupenga, Permanent Secretary, Northwestern Province
2. Augustine Seyuba, Permanent Secretary, Western Province
3. Hezron Chakanika, Senior Refugee Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs
4. Jacob Mphepo, Commissioner for Refugees, Ministry of Home Affairs
5. Kafula Chisanga, Acting Chief Planner, Western Province
6. Mate I. Kwibisa, Ministry of Education, Western Province
7. M.C. Mulongo, Director, Department of Resettlement, Office of the Vice President
8. Mukungu Mwiya, Agricultural Officer, Western Province
9. Tonny Mwanalushi, Assistant Surveyor General, Ministry of Lands
10. Amos Malupenga, Permanent Secretary of Solwezi
11. Mr. Chingi, Deputy Permanent Secretary of Solwezi
12. Mr. Ngoma, Assistant Secretary, Solwezi
13. Mr. Ndhlovu, Water Affairs office of Solwezi
14. Mr. Munachusi, Ministry of Agriculture, Solwezi.

#### *Mayukwayukwa Settlement*

15. Bwalya, Extension Assistant, Agriculture
16. E. Mutale, Child Protection Officer
17. Maurun Mushima, HIV/AIDS/PEPFAR Officer
18. Mercy Silwmesi, Field Coordinator, Community Development
19. Muhamubi, Field Coordinator, Agriculture
20. Nyunda Chikwekwe, Field Coordinator, Education
21. R.M. Mwaba, Refugee Officer
22. R. Siabusuki, Community Development Officer

#### *Meheba Settlement*

23. Joseph Musondo, Refugee Officer
24. Ministry of Agriculture Officer
25. Water affairs Officer
26. Ministry of Health Clinical Officer
27. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Protection Focal Point
28. Ministry of Education Officer

#### **Government of the Republic of Angola**

29. Alfred Maianhi, Vice Consul, Solwezi
30. Antonio Alberto Sawimbo, Consul General, Solwezi
31. Domingos Mazala Ricardo, General Consul, Mongu
32. João Aurélio Simões Júnior, Second Secretary, Embassy of Angola

### *Traditional Leaders*

- 33. Chief Matebo
- 34. Chief Mumena XI
- 35. Chief Mutondo

### *United Nations and Other International Organizations*

- 36. Andrew Choga, Chief of Mission, IOM
- 37. Biskut Getahun, Head of UNHRC Solwezi Office
- 38. Felix Ngoma, Operations Manager, IOM
- 39. Geoffray K. Sakulala, Protection Associate, Mongu
- 40. Hamid El-Bashir Ibrahim, Country Representative, UNICEF
- 41. Laura Lo Castro, Country Representative, UNHCR
- 42. Nalini Kumar, Senior Operations Officer, The World Bank
- 43. Peter Janssen, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR

### *Partner Governments*

- 44. Bernd Finke, Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany
- 45. Chris Foley, Project Development Officer, USAID
- 46. Debra Mosel, Supervisory Program Officer, USAID
- 47. Kiyoshi Koinuma, Ambassador, Embassy of Japan
- 48. Kumar Gupta, Head of Office, High Commission of Canada
- 49. Lars Sigurd Valvatne, Counselor, Royal Norwegian Embassy
- 50. Machida Hideaki, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
- 51. Maud Droogleever Fortuyn, Chief Protection Officer, UNICEF
- 52. Robert Romanowski, Consul, U.S. Embassy
- 53. Sera Kariuki, Education Chief, UNICEF

### **Refugees**

<b>Interview Type</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Eligibility for Local Integration</b>	<b>Government Settlement vs Self-Settled</b>
Focus Group – Angolans	129 Males 78 Females	<18 20% 18-29 10% 30-50 40% >50 30%	48%	GS 65% SS 35%
In-depth One-on-One – Angolans	10 Males 11 Females	<18 5% 18-29 24% 30-50 38% >50 33%	57%	GS 100%
Focus Groups – Zambian Host Community	26 Males 23 Females	<18 0% 18-29 12% 30-50 45% >50 43%	n/a	n/a
<b>TOTAL</b>	165 Males 112 Females <b>277 TOTAL</b>	<18 15.5% 18-29 11% 30-50 40% >50 33%	49%	GS 68% SS 32%

## DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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<http://www.unhcr.org/407d3b762.html>
- Government of the Republic of Zambia. "Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia." January 2014.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia. "Criteria and Procedures for Local Integration of Former Angolan Refugees." July 2012.
- Kuhlman, Tom. "The Economic Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries: Research Model." *Economic Integration of Refugees*. London: Oxford University Press. 1990.  
<ftp://zappa.ubvu.vu.nl/19900035.pdf>
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- UNCHR Website – Global Appeal, Global Reports, Operation Reports, Resettlement, Zambia Reports
- UNHCR. "Convention relating to the Status of Refugees." 1951.  
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>
- UNHCR. "Evaluation of the Zambia Initiative." February 2006.

## **ATTACHMENT B: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE LOCAL INTEGRATION OF FORMER REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA**

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Government of the Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Home Affairs, and UNCHR, January 2014

## **ATTACHMENT C: IRC'S APPROACH TO COMMUNITY-DRIVEN RECONSTRUCTION**

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A basic primer to first generation programming, designed for contextual adaptation, April 2007